This research reasons through epistemic, journalistic, political, and moral facts and arguments on mitigating or preventing further anthropogenic climate change and preserving natural resources. To slow down anthropogenic climate change global forces, inclusive of governments, NGOs, and collective humanity, should help indigenous peoples to protect their territories and property. Important to the philosophical arguments is understanding the 2015 murder of Berta Cáceres, a Honduran environmental activist, by military members of Honduras at the instruction of the Honduran joint chiefs of staff as well as the likely involvement of an energy company. The conditional that grounds the essay is this: If global forces were to enforce protection of indigenous communities affected by the negative effects of urbanization and globalization, then there would be a mitigating effect on anthropogenic climate change.
Henrich (see the details of them in the "Praxis and global collective action" section) in their clarifications and research on human evolutiontribal social instincts provide avenues for achieving Locke's moral imperatives for world order in contemporary world society. We can claim without much controversy that science does not control our minds or cultures, even though it may facilitate certain aspects of communication and allows for technological possibilities otherwise not able to be brought into existence.
Despite any advance in acquiring economic wealth or acceleration in communication or acquisition of material possessions, Locke contended that such "material issues" could not stop "culture feuds and value intolerances" (Locke 1944 (Locke /1989b . He continues: …[science and technology] can quite more easily serve to intensify the conflict as the geographical distance between cultures is shortened and their technological disparities are leveled off. It is, after all, our values and value systems that have divided us apart from and in many cases over and above our material issues of rivalry and conflict. If we are ever to have less conflict and more unity, it must come about in considerable part from some deep change in our value attitudes and our cultural allegiances. The increasing proximity of cultures in the modern world makes all the more necessary some corrective adjustment of their "psychological distance." (Locke 1944 (Locke /1989b emphasis mine) As a quick aside, this passage is not to be interpreted as "anti-science." It is to be properly interpreted as identifying a limitation of science in human civilization and global society to work toward solutions that have this limitation in the background. The upshot is that since cultures and value attitudes are what divide people, what creates "psychological distance" when they are in serious opposition, scientific and technological enterprises can do little on their own to bring us together, and in some cases may intensify conflicts. Science and technology may drive us apart as tools of war and destruction of communities or by protecting immorally entrenched corporate and economic interests.
Critiquing ethical theories for being insufficiently action guiding
Stephen M. Gardiner (2011) claims that in the "theoretical storm" climate change involves the intersection of many problems. The theoretical storm is comprised of problems with the "best" candidate political and moral theories for reasoning about the planetary environment (Gardiner 2011, 41) . Conventional approaches to public policy are not well equipped to handle the following problems associated with the theoretical storm: 1) Uncertainty ESPINOZA, R. Indigenous Environmental Interests of climate models; 2) the very long-term; and 3) the creation of different preferences and persons (Gardiner 2011, 213) . There are many dimensions for possible alterations to the planetary climate, and we do not know all the negative or positive consequences that could come about (Gardiner 2011, 189) .
Gardiner constructs four salient change scenarios in terms of the planetary climate that are important for the security concerns of humanity and for the well-being of our and future generations: Scenario 1, Soft Landing: creeping change with significant but highly malleable, negative impacts; Scenario 2, Rough Landing: Substantial change with major, and moderately malleable, negative impacts; Scenario 3, Hard Landing: Dramatic change with severe, and poorly malleable, negative impacts; Scenario 4, Crash Landing: Spectacular change with catastrophic negative impacts with no malleability (2011, (223) (224) .
For Gardiner, conventional institutions and theories can likely handle the first two change scenarios (Soft and Rough Landings), but they are not likely to handle the latter two (Hard and Crash Landings). Applying the framework of Jane Gordon and Lewis Gordon (2009/2016) , climate change runs on a continuum of disaster and catastrophe (8-9). There is the scientific facts and predictions that models and climate scientists can tell us about, then there is the social implications and collective action we can enact (or not) to mitigate or prevent disasters that become catastrophes that become disasters that become catastrophes, ad infinitum. We may learn to heed the warnings of destruction and choose, through collective strategy, to mitigate or prevent the negative effects from anthropogenic climate change. Gardiner's salient change scenarios are important to keep in mind to refine the theoretical debate on the continuum of disaster that climate change signifies. We can use the scenarios to help us decide how to mitigate or prevent further negative, disastrous, and catastrophic effects from anthropogenic climate change. Summarizing Gardiner's worries, the latter two scenarios, Hard and Crash Landings are the most worrisome in relation to conventional institutions and theories (2011, 224 Haidt (2011) provides moral psychologists with the moral foundation of loyalty/betrayal. This is one moral component that can be used to the advantage of those wishing to address climate change. Based on the preceding considerations by Locke, it is necessary to find "corrective adjustments" to the "psychological distance" between societies and cultures, especially since scientific findings and new technologies keep closing the geographical gap between them, which has the potential to create conflict if left unchecked (1944/1989b, 77) .
Here is one set of suggestions helpful to those wishing to stop or slow down anthropogenic climate change: Lessons from Leonard Harris's work on philosophy of race can help protect IEIs. "The forces that unite humanity-such as common dominators of class interest, inclinations to pursue status, disdain for injustice to members of one's perceived community-can be marshalled to aid the destruction of sinister, unintentional, and structural racial formations of oppression" (Harris 1999, 449) . Not only can they be marshalled to destroy oppressive racial formations, but they also can be marshalled to destroy climate change disasters. Harris's historical research and philosophical analyses on Alain Locke shows in this set of recommendations. One can recognize the respect and working-out of problematics from Alain Locke's theories.
One of the most entrenched and hardest of topics to discuss in the mind of those in the USA is race. The topic of race shares this with the topic of climate change: even though it is all-encompassing and affects our social surroundings, it is hard to pick out its boundaries, since it is ubiquitous. Thus, if Harris's suggestions are good for dismantling racial oppression (and I believe they are), they are on the right track for us regarding climate change proposals to change culture when it comes to behaviors that would lead to climate protection. For changing culture around climate change, I will only expound on the last of the set Harris presents: "disdain for injustice to members of one's perceived community."
If indigenous groups, such as the Lenca, are part of our perceived community, we will be outraged at the treatment they have received and receive at the actions of national militaries and some energy corporations. This would be because we have a "disdain for injustice to members" of our community.
If indigenous groups are a part of our perceived community, we will disdain injustices they experience-injustice that hurts even more when we know that it is not only their human dignity that is being trampled on, but also the soil that feeds them (and millions of others). Still more outrageous and hurtful to us should be the killing of farmer activists in Central America in the process of disputes over land acquisition and reallocation from one indigenous group to nations or corporate entities. These injustices when voiced should outrage us and move us to ESPINOZA, R. Indigenous Environmental Interests action, to praxis. Granted, not every injustice can move us to action against that specific injustice since we have complicated lives filled with countless activities. Still, if no injustice moves us to action, we are not fulfilling our political, moral, and civic duties as inheritors of nations, of the world, or as moral agents. Berta was killed by military members from Honduras at the command of then active military officials of the country, according to credible testimony from First Sergeant Rodrigo Cruz (a pseudonym), whose identity was confirmed by "academics, community leaders, and activists" (The Guardian, 2016, June 21). Berta's daughter, Olivia Zúñiga, in an interview on Nicaraguan television, accused the Honduran federal government ["el Estado"], the military ["Fuerzas Armadas"], and Desarollos Energéticos S.A. (DESA) of being complicit in orchestrating the murder ["autores intelectuales" del asesinato] of her mother (La Prensa Gráfica, 2016, May 10). One suspect arrested for the murder connected to DESA was employee Sergio Rodríguez Orellana, manager of social and environmental issues for DESA, who said he the Xatruch taskforce is based [Rodrigo Cruz's former military unit]-has been the setting for a string of violent land disputes between powerful palm oil magnates and local farmers. More than 100 people, mainly peasant activists, have been killed, many at the hands of state or private security forces" (The Guardian, June 21, 2016). Our loyalties should be with Berta and her memory, supporting COPINH and environmental groups like it, that is, IEIs. We must side with Berta's memory and groups like COPINH by doing what we can, including monetary support and political activism, to support them. Preservation of planet Earth should be the concern of any of its inhabitants. Existential threats to the planet are bad long-term business, bad morals, bad for any species that cannot live outside the Earth's atmosphere. If anthropogenic climate change reaches some thresholds for rising global temperatures, the impacts on planetary ecosystems may not only be irreversible, but existential threats to an unpredictable, but large, number of species and their membership, including human beings. Protecting IEIs can mitigate or prevent aspects of anthropogenic climate change. Since some IEIs are, in some cases, forests and these aid as carbon-sinks, their protection is a mitigating factor, at least against C02. A different study would need to confirm the extent of this conclusion, as my evidence and empirical reasoning are limited. I take the existential threat argument concerning IEIs to be not only a moral issue, but also a practical solution, that is, a theoretical space where moral rightness and global collective action meet.
The dual moral case to protect Indigenous Environmental Interests
While uncertain due to lack of data how much IEIs mitigate or prevent negative consequences ESPINOZA, R. Indigenous Environmental Interests of anthropogenic climate change, we can reasonably state that stopping parts of an existential threat are a good, and this is precisely what protecting and preserving IEIs does.
The second moral argument is being against racism while protecting IEIs, from a basic commitment to universal human liberation. This morally justifies one reason to protect IEIs.
What is universal human liberation? "Universal human liberation is tied, for Harris, to open communities. Thus, he defines "American philosophy" in ways that include ethno-philosophies (philosophies that are created by a people and defined by their values and practices), but focuses on philosophies created by individuals who develop unique arguments and methods" (Harris, Pratt, and Waters 2002, 1) . We should understand Berta's actions as developing "unique arguments and methods." Her recognition with the 2015 Goldman Environmental Prize by the international community is an instance of her arguments and methods being widely recognized and endorsed by a prestigious philanthropic foundation that consults with environmental experts and organizations (Goldman Environmental Foundation 2019). Furthermore, "Everyone arrived from somewhere else; no human populations were ever owners, users, or agents commuting with natures in a static location and in isolation from others from the beginning of time... Every native or indigenous population is itself a consequence of earlier population growth, migration, or invasion" (Harris 2002, 5) . This leads us to infer that no group or individual has a moral right to the entire Earth, since we are temporally bound to special regions of the planet. Racism in its multiple insidious forms is often tied to reallocation or basic distribution of land and property. This is one covert mechanism by which IEIs are being disrespected and reallocated (sometimes to the point of stolen) through the justification of the utilitarian calculus of urban development from stronger national governments with militaries.
Lewis R. Gordon (1995 Gordon ( /1999 Foundations of Politics). Haidt agrees with neuroscientist Gary Marcus's analogy that the brain is a "first draft" of a book that nature provides. The brain, so the analogy goes, has language, morality, sexuality, etc. written on it, and one's upbringing and social circumstances shape it further in time (chapter 7, section A Note on Innateness). Haidt argues that "Secular West" moralities have a propensity to speak of and account for "harm and suffering" and "fairness and injustice," while largely ignoring four moral "taste receptors" (Haidt, 2011, Introduction, section What Lies Ahead). Those four moral values or "receptors" are "liberty, loyalty, authority, and sanctity" (Haidt, 2011, Introduction, section What Lies Ahead) . In Haidt's "Moral Foundations Theory" foundation number three is loyalty/betrayal. Haidt states, "The Loyalty/betrayal foundation is just a part of our innate preparation for meeting the adaptive challenge of forming cohesive coalitions. The original trigger for the loyalty foundation is anything that tells you who is a team player and who is a traitor, particularly when your team is fighting with other teams" (2011, chapter 7, section The Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation). Haidt has given moral psychology much to build on and ponder going forward regarding the foundations of morality and, for my purposes, has given an excellent introduction to understanding loyalty in general through the Loyalty foundation-again, composed of loyalty and betrayal.
An exploration and explanation of loyalty in the debate on the effects of global climate change by humanity is of the utmost importance if we want to help solve the theoretical problems with political and moral institutions Gardiner analyzes. While Gardiner does an excellent job in examining the convergence of the global, intergenerational, and theoretical aspects of this debate, his analysis of why we 'pass the buck' is incomplete without accounting for why people choose some commitments rather than others. 'Passing the buck' in our case refers to one generation of humans having knowledge of climate change's dire effects, but hoping, expecting, or not caring that a future generation finds ways to survive possible catastrophic effects. The alternative is the current generations taking on the challenge.
Humans are typically loyal to individual people, rather than to abstract categories of people as aggregates. Gardiner states, "…the affective mechanism [as opposed to the "analytical" mechanism] is likely to result in a particular problems' being marginalized by other-perhaps objectively less important concerns…" (2011, 194) . The analytical and affective mechanisms "acquire information in different ways: the affective tends to rely on personal experience, whereas the analytical favors statistical descriptions…" (2011, 193 ESPINOZA, R. Indigenous Environmental Interests groups than to bigger groups and the species. Consequently, an example that does not readily activate our cognitive mechanism for loyalty is future generations, especially when they are not one's children or one has no personal connection. Future generations are impersonal "categories" instead of, as Miguel de Unamuno in Tragic Sense of Life phrased, "flesh and bone" persons who suffer and die, especially die (1921/1954, 1) .
Part of the project of this paper tries to elucidate a sense of justice for future generations.
Providing justice to indigenous populations around the world that are adversely affected by anthropogenic climate change is one way to do this. Anthropogenic climate change, to make clear, largely occurs because of negative aspects of globalization and urbanization. So long as urbanization keeps encroaching on natural ecosystems by destroying species of animals and plants-sometimes key species such as apex predators-human civilization will become increasingly reliant on technologies that create environments, rather than work in them. This poses serious issues for logistics and overall feasibility.
The evolution of humanity is a topic often hard to breach. It is much easier to understand how other animals evolved, but, despite the complexities, humans have a long history of evolution. "The evolution of humans from primate ancestors involved the evolution of sympathy, loyalty, and pride in one's contribution to the group. These qualities originally supported simple tribes in which food was shared, territory defended, and rules enforced without any top-down leadership" (Richerson & Henrich 2012, 57) . Sympathy, loyalty, and pride are three emotions or functional values that form a substantive part of humanity's "tribal social instincts." Undergirding these instincts, which still accompany human societies, is "geneculture coevolution" (Richerson & Henrich 2012, 38) . A comprehensive and concise description of this process is the following:
The cultural and genetic elements of our social psychology interacted over the long run of human evolution. To judge from the stone tools humans left behind...human cultural sophistication probably evolved in several waves after about 2.6 million years ago….Molecular evidence suggests that humans have undergone a burst of genetic evolution in the wake of the origins of agriculture and some controversial arguments hold that psychological traits as well as those related to disease and diet responded in a major way to the development of food production and the larger, more sophisticated societies it made possible. (Richerson & Henrich 2012, 58) Thus, tribal social instincts are in place in humans today because of early humans' circumstances and their ongoing interaction with other humans and locales throughout history.
In line with the evidence, "enormous collective action enterprises" were made possible by "our ability to cooperate and trust conditionally" (Richerson & Henrich 2012, 58) . Interestingly, for ESPINOZA, R. Indigenous Environmental Interests Daniel Dennett, "Our wills are free, in the morally relevant sense, because our ancestors' superior capacities to take responsibility and commit to courses of action gave them comparable advantages over competitors" (Zawidzki 2007, 126) . Cooperation and trusting conditionally are consequences from the evolution of sympathy, loyalty, and pride. In conjunction with contemporary ongoing cultural evolution, human organizations today operate on principles shaped by tribal social instincts from early humans. Organizations that have too many employees that act selfishly as opposed to having a wider concern for the continuation of the organization tend to be worse off than those that have 'good norms'; good norms in this context are "social norms that effectively harness aspects of our evolved psychology in ways that led to success in inter-group competition" (Richerson & Henrich 2012, 57) . Overtime, cultural evolution has favored these kinds of groups because they engage our evolved psychology, which tends to benefit the group.
Having the capacity to be loyal does not of itself dictate who you should be loyal to. On this point, Gardiner says, "The perfect storm constitutes a non-neutral evaluative setting, and this poses special challenges for ethical action...we must pay attention to the ways important values are articulated, since the likelihood of their perversion is high" (2011, xi) . Similarly, Alain Locke endorsed a reconceptualization of the concept of loyalty and its application.
...the Roycean principle of "loyalty to loyalty," which though idealistic in origin and defense, was a radical break with the tradition of absolutism. It called for a revolution in the practice [sic] of partisanship in the very interests of the values professed. In its larger outlines and implications it proclaimed a relativism of values and a principle of reciprocity [that dictates no culture stays static and that cultures take from many sources to create their practices]. (Locke 1935 (Locke /1989a An obvious difference between Alain Locke and Gardiner is that Gardiner is not a full- 
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Values are functional transpositional systems" (1989, 79) . Furthermore, values, rules, or imperatives, that is, the "regulative normative rules we adopt" (Harris 1989, 80) are not only important to know for those of use working in moral philosophy and normative issues generally, but how we adopt and accept them are just as important. There may be normative rules that seem to be morally correct in theory, but if they are completely counter to how we adopt or accept them cognitively, they would violate the following ethical reality: Ethics cannot command or recommend for us, in this case joint action, to do the impossible. There are cases where the lines between the impossible and the improbable are not clear, but in a great deal of cases the lines are ethically and logically clear.
In sum, values play an important role for both Locke and Gardiner when it comes to collective action on a world-scale and they both believe that some values are not conducive to positive large-scale human cooperation.
Conclusion
Can we care about the ecosphere, the planetary environment, in the abstract? No, most of us cannot. I have argued that engaging our sense of loyalty is key to protecting and securing long-term human interests and the long-term survival of environments such as forests, rivers, oceans, and animals that reside therein. One could use explanations for tribal social instincts and the suggestions for engaging the human sentiment of loyalty to help either corporations trying to extract key natural resources from indigenous lands or to help indigenous groups supporting environmental protections. I argued for supporting the Argument for Indigenous Environmental Interests. The main argument is premises three through six in the introduction to this essay. Throughout the essay, I offered several supporting epistemic, journalistic, political, and moral reasons for protecting planet Earth and humanity by mitigating or preventing anthropogenic climate change.
